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Summary of the Thesis 
 
There are two hypotheses that I test in this paper. First, more concentrated banking system leads to less 
changes of bank lending in response to volatile interbank funding costs. The second hypothesis is the 
lending reaction of banks to interbank rates differs for different banks, and better banks can keep their 
lending more stable after Euribor shocks. I empirically test these two hypotheses, using data from banks 
in ten European countries during years 2004 to 2012. 
The market in the European Union has a bank-based model, in which only banks finance most of the 
corporations and customers. Bank loan in Europe is a form of finance that is not substitutable for most of 
the agents. The European Central Bank reported that shares of banks in credit intermediation in the EU 
represents around 70% -75% of debt financing to households and non-bank corporations, while in the 
USA this number is around 20% - 30%. Due to this structure, the impact of interbank funding cost on 
banks’ lending in Europe is a critical topic for a successful conduct of monetary policy in the interbank 
market. Any decline or miss-behavior of banks in their lending volume can lead to a recession in the 
Euro-zone economy. The transmission of policies across a coalition of different European countries may 
have diverse effects across countries. An important factor that may influence the transmission of 
interbank funding costs to the banks’ lending volume is the banking sector concentration. An increase in 
the interbank rates may cause some banks to reduce their loan supply. This reduction may, however, be 
asymmetric across different banks. Whether or not banks have access to alternative sources of their 
funding can change their lending responses. This asymmetry depends on the bank characteristics as well 
as the structure of the banking sector. In a highly-concentrated banking sector, banks with less market 
share may have less access to alternative funding sources than their larger rivals, or, on the other hand, 
large banks with large market share have easier access to external financing. Thus, an increase in 
interbank funding costs may have less effect on larger banks in the highly concentrated banking sector, 
compare to banks in the less concentrated sector. 
The aim of this study is to shed light on how bank characteristics and concentration affect the bank 
respond to interbank funding costs variation in Euro area. Moreover, I explore the effect of Euribor (an 
indicator of the European interbank funding cost) on bank lending growth before and after the global 
financial crisis. I use a panel of banks from ten European countries for the period 2004 to 2012. The 
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choice of Eurozone countries is with the intention of investigating the effect of a unique funding rate on 
banks in countries with different levels of concentration but the same set of regulations. 
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Introduction 
 
There are two hypotheses I test in this paper. First, more concentrated banking system leads to less 
changes of bank lending in response to volatile interbank funding costs. The second hypothesis is the 
lending reaction of banks to interbank rates differs for different banks, and better banks can keep their 
lending more stable after Euribor shocks. I empirically test these two hypotheses, using data from banks 
in ten European countries during years 2004 to 2012. 
The market in the European Union has a bank-based model, in which only banks finance most of the 
corporations and customers. Bank loan in Europe is a form of finance that is not substitutable for most of 
the agents. The European Central Bank reported that shares of banks in credit intermediation in the EU 
represent around 70% -75% of debt financing to households and non-bank corporations, while in the 
USA this number is approximately 20% - 30%. Due to this structure, the impact of interbank funding cost 
on banks’ lending in Europe is a critical topic for a successful conduct of monetary policy in the interbank 
market. Any decline or miss-behavior of banks in their lending volume can lead to a recession in the 
Euro-zone economy. The transmission of policies across a coalition of different European countries may 
have diverse effects across countries. An important factor that may influence the transmission of 
interbank funding costs to the banks’ lending volume is the banking sector concentration. An increase in 
the interbank rates may cause some banks to reduce their loan supply. This reduction may, however, be 
asymmetric across different banks. Whether or not banks have access to alternative sources of their 
funding can change their lending responses. This asymmetry depends on the bank characteristics as well 
as the structure of the banking sector. In a highly concentrated banking sector, banks with less market 
share may have less access to alternative funding sources than their larger rivals, or, on the other hand, 
large banks with significant market share have easier access to external financing. Thus an increase in 
interbank funding costs may have less effect on larger banks in the highly concentrated banking sector, 
compare to banks in the less concentrated industry. 
This study aims to shed light on how bank characteristics and concentration affect the bank respond to 
interbank funding costs variation in Euro area. Moreover, I explore the effect of Euribor (an indicator of 
the European interbank funding cost) on bank lending growth before and after the global financial crisis. 
I use a panel of banks from ten European countries for the period 2004 to 2012. The choice of Eurozone 
countries is with the intention of investigating the effect of a single funding rate on banks in countries 
with different levels of concentration but the same set of regulations. 
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The changes in the interbank rates affect rates of bank lending and deposits for households and firms, 
which leads to changes in consumption, savings and investment decisions in the economy. This channel 
is the so-called interest rate channel in Euro area. According to articles by ECB, the interest rate channel 
in the eurozone is the channel with the most substantial effect on the economy. 1 The role of the money 
market is crucial to determine the interest rates in the marketplace. Banks’ refinancing conditions are 
the most important determinants of the rates on loans and deposits of firms and households. In normal 
times, the ECB influences money market by setting its key interest rates. ECB allocates the amount of 
liquidity needed by the banking sector. There is a minimum reserve system for the banks which ensures 
that they can afford their reserve requirements on average over a maintenance period of one month. 
This reserve system guarantees that the overnight money market rate reflects the official interest rate. 
This is the way through which the ECB’s interest rate decisions flow to the financial markets and with 
some delay to the real economy. 
At the end of the day banks taking into account the reserve requirements imposed by ECB take action to 
borrow or lend funds. The most prominent part of liquidity provision takes place in the interbank money 
market. Cash market, short-term security market and the market for derivatives are the three kinds of 
interbank market. Cash market consists of the unsecured market, the Repo market, and the foreign 
exchange swap market. Overnight maturity segment is the segment with Eonia (Euro Overnight Index 
Average) as a reference rate in Europe. Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) is the rate with which one 
prime bank offers euro interbank term deposits to another prime bank 2. In other words, Eonia is the 
short maturity of Euribor, which is the reference rate for maturities of more than one week. In addition 
to Eonia, there is another rate used in the interbank market in Europe and the United States, which is 
Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate). Libor is the average interbank interest rate at which a selection of 
banks on the London money market are prepared to lend to one another. 3 
There is an extensive literature analyzing the lending and credit channel in the real economy. The effect 
of interbank funding cost on bank lending in Europe has one specific characteristic. Euribor affects 
different European countries with the various banking sector. The primary aim of this paper is to tackle 
the heterogeneous responses of the bank to the unique interbank rate. 
 
 
 
 
1 
See the article entitled “Recent findings on monetary policy transmission in the euro area”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, October 
2002; and the article entitled “Monetary policy transmission in the euro area”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, July 2000. 
2
Euribor was first published on 30 December 1998 (value 4 January 1999). 1 January 1999 was the day that the Euro as a 
currency was introduced. In the years before, a lot of domestic reference rates like Pibor (France) and Fibor (Germany) existed. 
3 Just like Euribor, Libor comes in 15 different maturities. The main difference is that Libor rates come in 10 different currencies. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two I examine the related literature and explain 
the contributions of this research to the field. Section three presents the dataset and the main 
descriptive statistics. Section four discusses the empirical strategy and the model I propose. Section five 
contains the results of the baseline specifications. Finally, section six concludes with the paper. 
 
 
Literature 
 
To test the bank lending channel, it is crucial to identify the loan supply effect of monetary policy. This 
effect is not alike among different banks. The presence of the information asymmetry between the 
market participants leads to the different impacts of monetary policy on various banks. For example, 
some banks find it harder to maintain their loan portfolio in case of a drop in their resolvable deposits. 
This kind of implication has been analyzed using individual bank data. Bank characteristics serve as a 
proxy for different levels of banks’ access to the funding. Most of the studies considered three bank 
characteristics to be the determinant of bank lending behavior. The size of the bank, the level of liquidity, 
and level of capitalization. According to Kashyap and Stein (1995) size is a crucial factor in banks’ balance 
sheet to affect the transmission of monetary policy for US banks. Small banks decrease their lending 
more than large ones after a positive monetary policy shock. This is due to their severe problem of 
informational asymmetry. Small banks find it harder to raise funds in times of monetary tightening. 
Kashyap and Stein (1997), find the lending channel in the USA via small and less liquid banks. Kishan and 
Opiela (2000) and Van den Heuvel (2002) find that better-capitalized banks in the US have more access 
to external non- deposit financing, and they reduce their lending less than poorly capitalized banks do. 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ashcraft (2004), show that more liquid banks can use their liquid assets to 
compensate for any drop in their assets and thus the decline in their lending volume after a monetary 
shock is less than that for less liquid banks. However, the literature on European bank lending channel is 
not conclusive. Altenbas et al. (2002) using a dataset from largest European banks find the bank lending 
channel works via less capitalized banks in Europe. Using a dataset for European banks, Ehrmann et al. 
(2001) see that less liquid banks change their lending supply in response to monetary policy changes. 
Gambacorta (2005) use a dataset from Italian banks and see that bank lending channel works through 
illiquid and less capitalized banks. Favero, et al. (1999) in a cross-sectional analysis using BankScope 
dataset, do not find the significance of bank size to explain the reaction of bank lending to monetary 
policy for several European countries. The result in the paper by Ehrmann et al. (2003) has the same 
finding as for the paper by Favero et. (1999). They do not find the bank size as the discriminating 
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variable. On the other hand, DeBondt and Prast (2000) using the same dataset, in a panel analysis 
detects the size of the banks crucial to the lending channel. 
 
This paper also connects to the literature on the banking sector concentration and its effect on banks 
during the crisis. According to some theoretical literature and country comparisons, the less 
concentrated banking sector is more prone to financial crisis, while a concentrated banking sector with a 
few large banks is considered to be less fragile (Allen and Gale (2000, 2003)). According to Beck et al. 
(2003) more concentrated banking system is less prone to crisis and it is less volatile. Large banks can 
diversify better, and this causes less fragility in the more concentrated banking system. On the other 
hand, higher profit, which is enhanced in higher banking sector concentration, can provide the system 
with a buffer against shocks. In addition to that, concentrated banking system brings more profit and. 
Therefore, it provides a buffer against shocks (Hellmann et al. (2000)). 
 
 
Data 
 
 
The sample used in the study consists of annual observation of more than 2000 commercial banks, 
savings banks, cooperative banks and real estate and mortgage banks during years 2004 to 2012. The 
balance-sheet data for the banks is obtained from BankScope, a database by International Bank Credit 
Analysis Ltd. and the Brussels-based Bureau van Dijk. I use the data for all the banks active in the ten 
Euro-zone countries. Countries in this paper are as following: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia. To analyze the impact of interbank funding cost on bank 
lending behavior, I use Euribor with different maturities and its spread as the representative for funding 
costs. For the first part of the analysis, I calculate the number of outstanding loans by summing up the 
data for each country in each year and then calculating the growth of those loans for each period. So the 
main dependent variable is the annual growth of lending in each country. 
I follow Favero et al (1999), Allen et al (2010), Stein (1995), Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Beck et al. (2013) 
in choosing the bank characteristics in this analysis. Many different bank elements affect the lending 
behavior of banks. Several features of the banking sector structure of different countries is essential for 
the response of bank lending to short-term interest rate changes. 
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Bank Specific variables: 
 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the outstanding amount of loans for each bank to non-banks. 
Bank specific ratios in the analysis are chosen to represent the dimensions of size, capital strength, 
liquidity, and profitability. Size is the number of banks’ total assets; capital strength is measured by the 
ratio of equity to total assets; liquidity is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-
term funding ratio; profitability is the ratio return on average equity. I expect larger banks in respond to 
higher interbank rates, decrease their lending less than smaller banks. More capitalized banks have more 
buffers thus I expect them to react less to higher funding costs. More liquid banks are expected to have 
less reaction to variations of Euribor. Finally, banks with higher profit should decrease their lending less 
when Euribor increases. As control variables in the analysis, I also use deposit (ratio of deposit to total 
assets) and interbank positions (ratio of interbank assets to interbank liabilities). 
 
Country-specific variables: 
 
 
I obtain the data for the GDP and inflation of the countries from the World Bank online database. As an 
indication of the banking sector concentration in different countries, I use the C5 index retrieved from 
World Bank Financial Development dataset. C5, which is the sum of the share of the assets of the five 
largest banks in each country and during each year. 
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𝐶5 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖 
𝑖=1 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
 
Monetary policy transmits via several channels to the real economy. Traditional interest rate channel has 
highlighted the direct impact of interest rates on loan demand. The demand for credit decreases after 
monetary tightening since it causes interest rates to increase. The credit channel amplifies the effects of 
the interest rate channel by influencing the supply of bank loans. The risk-taking channel highlights the 
impact of monetary policy on the quality of bank lending.
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There is a simple theoretical model in the literature to define the bank lending channel, by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1998). This framework assumes that in equilibrium deposit demand (D) equals money supply 
(M) and the money demand depends on monetary policy (mp) and another factor (σ): 
 
D=M=-(mp)+σ 
 
(1) 
 
Loan demand, on the other hand, depends on GDP (Y), Inflation (P) and loan interest rate (r) : 
 
Ld = 1 Y+ 2 P - 3 r 
(2) 
 
Loan supply depends on the funds such as deposits (D), loan interest rate (r), and the monetary policy 
(mp): 
 
 
Ls = 1 D + 2 r + 3 mp 
(3) 
 
Where D is also a function of monetary policy according to equation (1). 
 
Following Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ehrmann et al. (2001), I assume that banks are affected by 
deposits according to their characteristics (Xi). Size, liquidity, Capitalization are the three characteristics 
used in the literature. I add bank profitability to these characteristics, and in addition to that I add 
banking sector concentration (BC) to the analysis to test for the impact of bank concentration on the 
lending channel. 
 
Thus, we will have the following equation in equilibrium: 
 
L= 1Y + 2P+ 3mp + 4 Xi + 5 BC + 6mp*Xi + 7mp*BC +8Xi*BC + constant 
(4) 
 
Which implies that loan supply depends on the economic output, the level of prices, monetary policy 
stance, bank-level characteristics, Banking sector concentration, the interaction of bank characteristics 
with concentration and monetary policy, the interaction of concentration with bank characteristics and 
the interaction of monetary policy and banking concentration. 
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In the literature, typically this correlation is analyzed as a dynamic equation as in Erhmann et al. (2003), 
which used difference GMM method (Arellano and Bond (1991)). In their method, lagged valued of loan 
growth has a significant effect on banking lending. However, I use a simple fixed effect in this paper. This 
is because the coefficient of lagged value of loan growth is not significant in my analysis. This can be due 
to the nature of my dataset that is annual. I regress loan growth on lagged values of dependent 
variables, and I did not find any reason for the effect of lending on the variables in the previous period. 
So, I believe that in this analysis I can use a normal fixed-effect method. 
 
I run the following panel fixed effect specification: 
 
𝐘𝐣𝐭 = 𝛃𝟏𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐨𝐫𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛃𝟐𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐨𝐫𝐭−𝟏. 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬+ 𝛃𝟑𝐒𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛃𝟒𝐒𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐭−𝟏. 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬 + 𝛅𝐗𝐣𝐭 + 
𝛂𝐣 + 𝛆𝐢𝐭 
 
(5) 
Where 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is the growth of outstanding loan of banks in country j at time  t. 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡−1  is the Euribor  
with one week maturity. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 is the spraed of one-week and one-year Euribor and we use these 
variables with one time lag to minimize the possible endogeneity issue. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one from 2009 to 2012 and zero otherwise. We exclude the year 2008 since it was 
the year when the Lehman collapse happened. Since the residuals may be correlated across banks and 
across time, we cluster standard errors at the bank level. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 which is the vector of bank controls. 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is 
the vector of country contorls. 𝛼𝑗 is the country fixed effects. 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is the error term. Results of this 
regression are reported in Table 3. In this stage the growth of outstanding loan of banks is an aggregate 
level. 
As the next step in the analysis, we interact the dependent variables with W, which is a dummy variable 
for four bank characteristics. These variables are as following; Large, Capitalized, Liquid, ROE. Where 
Large is a dummy that is one if the bank is among the top 75% in size and zero otherwise. Capitalized is a 
dummy that takes the values one if the bank is among the top 75% capitalized banks in the sample and 
takes the values zero otherwise. The liquid is a dummy that is one if the bank is among the 75% most 
liquid banks in the sample and zero otherwise. The dummy ROE is one if bank’s return of average equity 
is among the highest 75% banks in the sample, and it is zero otherwise. 
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Results 
 
In Table 3, I report the main outcomes of the analysis before and after the crisis. In column (1) of this 
table, I have the regression without controls and fixed effects. In column (2), I show the results with only 
bank and country-specific controls and in column (3) I have both controls and fixed effects. The 
coefficient for Euribor is negative and highly significant in all three columns for the years after the crisis. 
This implies that, after global financial crisis banks are more sensitive to the changes in short terms 
interbank rates compare to the times of crisis. The coefficient of spread is positive and highly significant 
for years after the crisis. This indicates that, as the rate of longer-term funding costs increases banks 
enhance their lending to non-banks, since those loans are usually longer-term loans, and banks can 
impose the longer-term cost on their non-bank borrowers. Therefore, in this table I find evidence of the 
larger negative effect of short-term funding cost on bank lending growth after financial crisis compares 
to the years before the crisis. 
 
In the next set of analysis, I run the regression for the bank level lending growth and add two dummies 
to the regression. First, is the dummy if the bank is large, second is the dummy if the bank is located in a 
high banking sector concentration. Table 4 shows the results of the analysis with the two dummies, 
Large, and BC. In column (1), I compare the large banks with their smaller rivals before and after the 
financial crisis. The coefficient of Euribor for small banks after crisis shows that when Euribor increases 
by one basis point smaller banks reduce their lending volume by 3.6% more compared to larger banks. 
These results provide evidence that after crisis large banks were less exposed to changes in interbank 
funding costs. In column (2), of Table 4 I compare the large banks in countries with low banking 
concentration and those in high banking concentration. Results show that there is no effect from 
concentration level on the lending channel. Column (3), shows that large banks located in countries with 
high banking sector concentration compare to large banks in other countries increase their lending by 
5.2% more to non-banks when Euribor increases by one basis point. The main result from this table is 
that larger banks were less vulnerable to changes in interbank rates than smaller banks, in both high and 
low level of concentration. Moreover, there is no evidence of the impact of banking sector concentration 
on bank lending for banks with different sizes. 
 
In Table 5, I compare banks with lower and higher level of liquidity. In column (1) of this table, the 
coefficients of Euribor is negative and significant for less liquid banks during years before and after the 
crisis. This result implies that less liquid banks are more negatively affected by interbank rate shocks 
compare to more liquid banks. In columns (2), more liquid banks in lower banking sector concentration 
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after an increase of one basis point in Euribor, decrease their lending by 2% more compared to liquid 
banks in higher concentrated markets. 
In column (3), all the coefficients are insignificant. This result implies that less liquid banks are more 
prone to drop in their lending volume compare to more liquid banks when facing changes in interbank 
funding costs. 
In Table 6, I compare banks’ lending responses to Euribor according to their capitalization level. When 
Euribor increase by one basis point, banks with a lower level of capitalization decrease their lending to 
non-banks by 22% compare to better-capitalized banks. In column(2) of this table, I show that well-
capitalized banks located in less concentrated banking sectors decrease their lending volume after a 
positive shock to Euribor, compare to well-capitalized banks in the higher concentrated banking market. 
These results imply that higher banking sector concentration leads to less reaction to monetary policy for 
better-capitalized banks. 
 
Finally Table 7 shows the results for banks with high profitability compared to other banks. In the column 
, (1) the coefficient of Euribor indicates that after a positive shock to Euribor by one basis, less profitable 
banks cut their lending by 21% more than their more profitable rival. In column (2), results show that 
when Euribor increases by one basis point more profitable banks in less concentrated banking industry 
decrease their lending by 1.7% more before crisis compares to their rivals in the higher concentrated 
market. This number is almost 2% after the crisis. This finding indicates that more profitable banks in 
higher banking sector concentration are less vulnerable to interbank funding rates shocks. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence in favor of the negative and significant impact of Euribor variation 
on banks’ lending volume. Especially after the financial crisis the effect of Euribor as an index on 
interbank funding cost on bank lending is negative and significant. I investigate bank and country-specific 
characteristics to shed light on the asymmetric reactions of banks with different characteristic being 
located in different banking industry concentration level. Using more than 2000 banks in ten European 
countries during the year 2004 to 2012, I find that banks are more vulnerable to external funding rates 
after the global financial crisis.I interpret this result as the existence of a stronger and more significant 
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bank lending channel after the world financial crisis. Moreover, this paper provides evidence that after a 
positive shock to Euribor, smaller, less liquid, less capitalized, less profitable banks are more prone to 
decrease their lending. Finally, I find that banking sector concentration influences the lending channel. 
Better banks located in the higher concentrated banking sector, are less affected by interbank costs. This 
may be because, more capitalized, more liquid and more profitable banks in higher concentered banking 
sector have better buffers against external funding shocks. This finding is in line with the Basel III focus 
on banks’ core capital and on funding liquidity risks. Banks with weaker core capital positions, greater 
dependence on market funding and non-interest sources of income-restricted the loan supply more 
strongly during the crisis period. My findings lead to two conclusions. One, the lending channel in Europe 
is stronger after the global financial crisis. Second, banking sector concentration matters for monetary 
policy transmission. The bank lending channel is weaker in higher concentrated markets. Therefore, the 
monetary transmission is less effective in a highly-concentered banking sector. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
 
In this table, we report the variables and their descriptions. 
 
 
Variable Descriptions 
 
 
Lending Log of amount of outstanding loan of each bank to non-bank firms winsorized on 99%/1% level 
Euribor Euribor rate of one-week maturity 
Spread Spread of one-week and one-year Euribor 
Post_crisis Dummy variable that takes the value one from 2009 to 2012 and zero otherwise 
Size Log of total assets of the bank winsorized on 99%/1% level 
Deposit Ratio of deposits to total assets winsorized on 99%/1% level 
Capital Ratio of capital to total assets, winsorized on 99%/1% level 
Return of equity Average return of equity winsorized on 99%/1% level 
Liquidity Ratio of liquid asset to total assets winsorized on 99%/1% level 
Interbank Position Ratio of interbank assets to interbank liabilities, winsorized on 99%/1% level 
GDP Growth of real GDP in each country 
Inflation Rate of inflation of each country 
16  
Table 2 
 
Panel A: Banking Sector Concentration (the year 2006) Panel B: Lending (the year 2006) 
Country Mean Sd Min Max 
Number of 
banks 
Sum of outstanding 
loans  (billion Euros) 
Mean of outstanding 
loans (Million Euros) 
 
Austria 
 
0.62 
 
0.418 
 
-6.046 
 
9.845 
 
236 
 
5,790 
 
2,970 
Belgium 0.96 0.57 -6.641 3.784 42 7,060 22,120 
Germany 0.57 0.183 -4.410 3.181 1577 29,600 2,226 
Spain 0.5 0.442 -7.281 2.639 92 10,400 17,050 
Finland 0.20 0.913 -5.020 6.047 15 1,200 11,860 
France 0.76 0.281 -3.195 2.735 203 27,800 17,740 
Italy 0.83 0.203 -4.488 4.158 518 13,800 4,108 
Netherlands 0.43 0.413 -4.174 1.301 30 14,800 67,240 
Portugal 0.43 0.339 -2.795 1.320 24 2,040 12,660 
Slovenia 0.59 0.193 -0.387 0.897 16 230 1,770 
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Table 3 
 
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of bank lending in each country. The first column 
shows the OLS regression. Columns (2) and (3) show the fixed effect regressions. The impact of Euribor 
on the growth of lending is highly significant after the financial crisis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Euribor -0.0034 -0.0163*** 0.0088 
 
Euribor*post_crisis 
-0.0029 
-0.0496*** 
0.0097 
-0.0029 
-0.2487*** 
-0.0474 
-0.0988 
-0.0354*** 
-0.0036 
Spread 0.0377** 0.0514*** -0.609 
Spread*post_crisis 
Country fixed effects 
0.0179 
0.0380*** 
0.0069 
NO 
0.0171 
0.1478*** 
-0.03 
NO 
-0.5473 
0.0319*** 
-0.0082 
YES 
Country controls NO YES YES 
Observations 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.17 0.32 0.39 
Panel estimation. 
The dependent variable is the growth of lending to non-bank industry. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered on bank level 
Covariates (bank characteristics): ln(Total assets), Deposits, Liquid assets / Total assets, Capital, Interbank ratio, ROE (all winsorized on 1% level), 
GDP-growth and Inflation. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 4 
 
The dependent variable is the number of outstanding loans. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Euribor -0.0084   
 -0.0989   
Euribor*Post_crisis -0.0366***   
 -0.0036   
Spread -0.6166   
 -0.5517   
Spread* Post_crisis 0.0351***   
 0.0082   
Euribor*Large 0.0074 0.0112  
 0.0168 0.0203  
Euribor*post_crisis*Large 0.0944 0.0577  
 0.421 0.892  
Spread*Large 0.0906 0.0212  
 (0.1122 0.1356  
Spread*post_crisis*Large 0.0803 0.0888  
 0.274 0.334  
Euribor*Large*BC  0.0601 0.0526** 
  0.354 0.0028 
Euribor*  0.1148 0.0573 
Post_crisis*Large*BC    
  0.514 0.0728 
Spread*Large*BC  0.3769 -0.3801** 
  0.2373 -0.1721 
Spread*  0.0242 0.0647 
Post_crisis*Large*BC    
  0.0581 0.0475 
Euribor*BC   -0.0364 
   -0.0188 
Euribor* Post_crisis*BC   -0.0184 
   -0.0229 
Spread*BC   -0.2155 
   -0.1476 
Spread* Post_crisis*BC   -0.0387 
   -0.0224 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 17199 17199 17199 
 
 
Panel estimation. 
   R-squared 0.2 0.27 0.17  
The dependent variable is the growth of lending to non-bank industry. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Large is a dummy for 
banks with total asset larger than 75% quartile in the sample. BC is a dummy for the banking sector concentration above 75% quartile in the 
sample. 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered on bank level 
Covariates (bank characteristics): Deposits, Liquid assets / Total assets, Capital, Interbank ratio, ROE (all winsorized on 1% level), GDP-growth 
and Inflation. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 
 
Comparing bank lending channel for more liquid and less liquid banks, high and low banking sector concentration 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Euribor -0.009**   
 -0.009   
Euribor*Post_crisis -0.035***   
 -0.003   
Spread -0.618   
 -0.552   
Spread* Post_crisis 0.028***   
 0.008   
Euribor*Liquid -0.018 -0.028**  
 -0.023 -0.004  
Euribor*post_crisis*Liquid -0.14 -0.165  
 -0.104 -0.104  
Spread*Liquid -0.162 0.228***  
 -0.157 0.001  
Spread*post_crisis*Liquid -0.063 -0.085  
 -0.068 -0.068  
Euribor* Liquid*BC  -0.029 -0.015 
  -0.172 -0.016 
Euribor* Post_crisis*Liquid*BC  -0.113 -0.081 
  -0.074 -0.075 
Spread* Liquid*BC  -0.198 -0.093 
  -0.416 -0.114 
Spread* Post_crisis*Liquid*BC  0.102 -0.085 
  0.469 -0.479 
Euribor* BC   -0.029 
   -0.018 
Euribor* Post_crisis*BC   -0.014 
   -0.022 
Spread* BC   -0.170 
   -0.147 
Spread* Post_crisis*BC   -0.023 
   -0.022 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 17199 17199 17199 
R-squared 0.12 0.17 0.19 
Panel estimation. 
The dependent variable is the growth of lending to non-bank industry. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Liquid is a dummy for 
banks with the liquidity of larger than 75% quartile in the sample. BC is a dummy for the banking sector concentration above 75% quartile in the 
sample. 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered on bank level 
Covariates (bank characteristics): ln(Total assets), Deposits, Capital, Interbank ratio, ROE (all winsorized on 1% level), GDP-growth and Inflation. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 6 
 
Comparing bank lending channel for better capitalized and less capitalized banks, high and low banking sector concentration 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Euribor -0.010   
 -0.026   
Euribor*Post_crisis -0.219**   
 -0.018   
Spread -0.092   
 -0.167   
Spread* Post_crisis -0.050   
 -0.078   
Euribor*Capitaliaze -0.046 -0.011**  
 -0.084 -0.004  
Euribor*post_crisis*Capitaliaze -0.217 -0.228***  
 -0.223 -0.053  
Spread*Capitaliaze -0.373 -0.023  
 -0.546 -0.023  
Spread*post_crisis*Capitaliaze -0.192 -0.144***  
 -0.172 -0.032  
Euribor*Capitaliaze*BC  -0.073 -0.012 
  -0.201 -0.036 
Euribor* Post_crisis*Capitaliaze*BC  -0.137 -0.009 
  -0.396 -0.092 
Spread*Capitaliaze*BC  -0.150 -0.033 
  -1.296 -0.244 
Spread* Post_crisis*Capitaliaze*BC  -0.142 -0.008 
  -0.226 -0.061 
Euribor*BC   -0.034 
   -0.187 
Euribor* Post_crisis*BC   -0.017 
   -0.022 
Spread* BC   -0.202 
   -0.147 
Spread* Post_crisis*BC   -0.034 
   -0.021 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 17199 17199 17199 
R-squared 0.21 0.33 0.37 
Panel estimation. 
The dependent variable is the growth of lending to non-bank industry. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. Capitalized is a dummy 
for banks with capitalization ratio larger than 75% quartile in the sample. BC is a dummy for the banking sector concentration above 75% 
quartile in the sample. 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on bank level 
Covariates (bank characteristics): ln(Total assets), Deposits, Liquid assets / Total assets, Interbank ratio, ROE (all winsorized on 1% level), GDP- 
growth and Inflation. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 7 
 
Comparing bank lending channel for more profitable and less profitable banks, high and low banking sector concentration 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Euribor -0.023   
 (-0.05)   
Euribor*Post_crisis -0.21***   
 (-0.001)   
Spread -0.19   
 (-0.33)   
Spread* Post_crisis -0.042   
 (-0.076)   
Euribor*ROE 0.0417 -0.017***  
 (0.06) (-0.005)  
Euribor*post_crisis*ROE -0.12 -0.196***  
 (-0.14) (-0.05)  
Spread*ROE -0.32 -0.059**  
 (-0.39) (-0.029)  
Spread*post_crisis*ROE 0.057 -0.11***  
 (-0.09) (-0.037)  
Euribor*ROE*BC  0.031 0.034 
  (0.19) (0.171) 
Euribor* Post_crisis*ROE*BC  -0.043 0.045 
  (-0.05) (0.055) 
Spread*ROE*BC  -0.1218** -0.20* 
  (-0.06) (-0.11) 
Spread* Post_crisis*ROE*BC  -0.025 -0.001 
  (-0.032) (-0.34) 
Euribor*BC   -0.034*** 
   (-0.001) 
Euribor* Post_crisis*BC   -0.014 
   (-0.023) 
Spread*BC   -0.101 
   (-0.16) 
Spread* Post_crisis*BC   -0.02 
   (-0.02) 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 17199 17199 17199 
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.24 
Panel estimation. 
The dependent variable is the growth of lending to non-bank industry. The explanatory variables are lagged one period. ROE is a dummy for 
banks with a return on average equity larger than 75% quartile in the sample. BC is a dummy for the banking sector concentration above 75% 
quartile in the sample. 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on bank level 
Covariates (bank characteristics): ln(Total assets), Deposits, Liquid assets / Total assets, Capital, Interbank ratio (all winsorized on 1% level), GDP- 
growth and Inflation. 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Introduction 
 
Financial intermediaries play an important role by collecting households’ savings to provide credit to 
firms. This asset transformation is undertaken by three types of depository institutions: private 
commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions. While an increasing number of papers analyze the 
former two types, and, in particular, their role in the financial crisis of 07/09, relatively little is known 
about credit unions (CUs). These depository institutions feature a distinct governance structure that is 
membership based in which each member has one vote. 
In this paper, we analyze the role of CUs in the financial crisis. We assess how CUs changed their 
lending volume during the financial crisis compared to non-credit unions. The direction of this effect is 
not clear, however. Credit unions are prototypical relationship lenders, which should provide members 
strong insurance against credit constraints in dire times (e.g., Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri, 1998). 
Compared to non-credit unions we thus expect credit union borrowers to cut back less on lending during 
the financial crisis (insurance effect). On the other hand, credit unions’ unique membership-based 
governance structure also features a potential disadvantage that members can walk away during 
distressed times and hence decrease a CU’s capital base. Thus, even though a CU might desperately like 
to keep lending volume high, it might not be able to do so because the lack of capital (equity effect). 
Which of the effects dominates is an open empirical question that we address in this paper. 
We use an extensive dataset provided by the Central Bank of Brazil that is covering the complete 
financial system. We have access to all individual loans above a very low threshold of Brazilian Real 5,000 
(around US-Dollars 2,500) for all banks active in the Brazilian credit market. The data level is triplets on 
the firm-bank-time level. It permits us very powerful identification within borrowers to disentangle 
between the insurance effect and the equity effect. Specifically, we investigate the impact on the 
extensive margin of the same firm at the same point in time for credit unions versus non-credit unions. 
Our identification strategy controls for demand shocks at the firm level, for other potential determinants 
of credit supply at the bank group-by- 
time level, and for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity at the bank-firm level. 
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We find that credit unions provided their members larger loans compared to what the other banks 
provided the same firms at the same time during the financial crisis. Hence, we find evidence that the 
membership-based credit unions provided insurance during times of distress. Also, credit unions did not 
cut back as much on credit during the crisis as their equity was decreasing compared to non-credit 
unions. We interpret this second finding as strong evidence that credit unions tried particularly hard to 
maintain their lending volume even when their capital cushion was getting thinner. 
 
 
 
Institutional Background 
 
 
Credit unions (or credit cooperatives) are depository institutions, which provide credit and 
financial services to their members. Historically, credit unions were founded to provide financial 
services to farmers, (small) firms, and poorer households, which were not covered by traditional 
banks. There are two principal characteristics of credit unions that make them distinct from 
other types of banks: First, in a credit union the members are both the owners of the 
organization and its customers. This stands in sharp contrast to private commercial banks, which 
are privately owned and often publicly traded on the stock market. Savings banks often have 
public ownership (e.g., in Germany, see Hackethal, 2004) or at least close ties to local 
governments. Second, in a credit union the membership provides both the demand for and 
supply of loanable funds. 
In recent years, the number of loans and services provided by credit unions and 
cooperative banks to their members has been increasing. According to a report by WOCCU 
(World Council of Credit Unions) in the year 2012, in aggregate loans paid by credit unions were 
US-Dollars 1,083 billion with the total of over 200 million members around the world.5 
The first credit union of Latin America was founded in Brazil in 1902. Today credit unions 
are among the largest financial institutions in this country. As of the year 2012 the network of 
these credit unions represents 18% of bank branches in Brazil, with the total managed asset 
 
5 
World council of credit unions, 2012. 
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representing 2.3% of the total assets of the country, occupying the 6th position.6 The number of 
credit union members in Brazil from the year 2005 to the year 2011 increased from 2.6 million 
to 5.8 million individuals. Over the last 30 years in Brazil, the numbers and assets of credit 
unions have increased significantly. The amount of net worth, assets, deposits and credit 
operations in Brazilian credit unions has been increasing during years 2000 until 2012. 
There are substantial differences between the credit unions and the commercial banks 
in Brazil. Interest rates of financial services provided by credit unions are much lower than the 
average interest rates of services provided by other financial institutions. According to the 
report by Brazilian Central Bank, to December 2011, the average interest rate on personal loans 
provided by Brazilian credit unions to their members was 26% per year, compare to the average 
interest rate of 110% for the same type of loans from other financial institutions in Brazil. 
Credit unions have an important role in Brazilians financial system. They mainly serve 
otherwise “under-banked” small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and households and are 
a textbook example for credit unions. It thus makes much sense to use the Brazilian banking 
market as a laboratory for our research question on whether credit unions were able to provide 
insurance to their members during the financial crisis of 07/09. 
 
 
Literature 
 
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. The first one aims at explaining the 
transmission of liquidity shocks to the real economy via the bank lending channel. There are 
various works providing evidence on this channel across banks (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000; 
Peek and Rosengren, 1997; Paravisini, 2008; Campello, 2002). They find that liquidity and/or 
capital constrained banks are more prone to transmit liquidity shocks to the economy by cutting 
back on lending. The lending channel, however, is only one side of the game. During times of 
economic distress, not only banks are hit but also firms are affected. Firms tend to reduce their 
investment activities in response to a crisis. This decrease in investment leads to a smaller loan 
 
6 
Portal do cooperativismo de credito. http://cooperativismodecredito.coop.br/cenario-brasileiro/ 
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demand (firm borrowing channel). The main empirical challenge is the simultaneous nature of 
these two channels. 
One approach to tackling this identification challenge is the inter-country transmission of 
liquidity shocks that was pioneered by Peek and Rosengreen (1997).7 They find that the liquidity 
shock in the Japanese market resulted in a declined lending activity of Japanese subsidiaries in 
the US. The implicit assumption in this natural experiment is that credit demand is not different 
between firms borrowing from Japanese subsidiaries and other banks such as domestic banks or 
other foreign, non-Japanese banks. 
Other authors have access to rich credit registry datasets and are thus able to use within-
firm estimators that completely rule out credit demand effects (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2008; 
Jimenez, et al., 2011; Schnabl, 2012; Bofondi et al. ,2012). This approach is feasible for firms that 
borrow at least from two banks at the same time and enables estimates for the same firm at the 
same point in time. We use this approach to investigate how credit unions changed credit 
supply during the financial crisis compared to other lenders. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the link between relationship banking and 
intertemporal smoothing from financial institutions to their borrowers. The insurance provided 
by financial intermediaries to their clients is the option, which arises, to smooth borrowers’ 
credit issues during distress times. According to Freixas and Rochet (1997) it is efficient for 
banks to provide insurance to their borrowers because of two reasons. First, bank portfolio is 
better diversified than those of the firms and second; banks have better access to funding and 
financial markets while risk can have a much more severe effect on firms. Allen and Gale (1997), 
justify the financial intermediation by insurance provision of financial institutions to their 
customers. Banks provide insurance only if they benefit from it. The biggest profit for banks 
from liquidity insurance provision is having the ex-post information monopoly (Freixas and 
Rochet,1997). Credit unions are particular in having a relationship with their borrowers. 
Relationship banking is a particular connection between the bank and a firm and with this 
assumption, firms with a closer relationship to their banks can enjoy being partly or fully insured 
 
7 
See also Schnabl (2012), Chava and Purnanandam (2011) 
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in bad times. Berlin and Mester (1999), argue that the form of insurance agents demand from 
their banks during a crisis is more in the form of liquidity insurance. They provide evidence that 
in a competitive system banks with higher core deposits provide more liquidity insurance to 
their borrowers. Those banks that rely more on the liabilities and funding from outside market 
have to pay higher interest rates and will be able to provide less insurance to their customers. 
Our paper also complements the literature on credit unions. In general, credit unions’ 
members benefit by receiving higher deposit rates or by paying lower loan rates than current 
market rates (Smith, Cargill, and Meyer, 1981; Smith, 1984). In addition, Angelini, Di Salvo, and 
Ferri (1998) find that on average credit cooperative bank members enjoy lower rates and easier 
access to credit than non-members. We contribute to this line of literature by investigating the 
insurance effect in times of financial distress. 
Finally, another strand of literature is about lending in developing markets and in 
particular in the Brazilian market. Schnabl (2012), show that bank liquidity shock transmits from 
country to country through international lending between banks. During the financial crisis 
originated from the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, Brazilian private banks reduced the 
fraction of deposits they use to lend out. Coleman and Feler (2013) show that Brazil’s 
government banks extended lending to prevent a sharper economic downturn. We extend this 
line of research by concentrating on credit unions as another type of financial institutions that 
might have stabilized the financial sector during the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
Empirical Strategy 
 
We use credit registry data on the firm-bank-quarter level. We use the following specification to 
investigate whether credit unions differ with respect to the lending volume during the financial 
crisis compared to other banks. We start with a specification without any fixed effects and 
covariates 
LoanAmountibt = α + CreditUnionb + Crisist + ßCreditUnionb *Crisist + εibt 
 
(1) 
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Where LoanAmountibt equals the total outstanding credit volume of bank b towards firm i at 
time t (Jimenez et al., 2011), CreditUnion takes the value 1 if bank b is a credit union and 0 
otherwise, and Crisis equals 1 between 2007Q4 to 2009Q4 and 0 otherwise. 
The main challenge is the simultaneous nature of the bank lending channel (credit 
supply) and the firm borrowing channel (credit demand). We completely capture any demand 
shocks at the firm level by using firm-time fixed effects controls, αit. This comes at the cost that 
we need to constrain our analysis to those firms with multiple bank relationships at the same 
time. Our most saturated specification is 
LoanAmountibt = αit + αib + αBt + ßCreditUnionb *Crisist + Xbt + εibt 
 
(2) 
Where the second set of fixed effects, αib, controls for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity 
at the bank-firm pair level. The third set of fixed effect, αBt, controls for other potential 
determinants of credit supply at the bank group level B of time t. We use three different bank 
groups in Brazil. CreditUnion is not a bank group on its own but that we add several banks to the 
bank group that includes credit unions that have similar characteristics. Vector X controls for a 
set of observable characteristics of bank b at time t such as the capital ratio, bank size etc. to 
control for further bank-specific determinants of credit supply not captured by the bank group- 
time fixed effects. 
The insurance effect, i.e., whether credit unions provide insurance in dire times to their 
members by maintaining the extensive margin of credit, is identified by within-firm differences 
of firms that have lending relationships to credit unions and other banks at time t. The 
coefficient of interest in the specification (2), ß, is the interaction of CreditUnion with Crisis. We 
concentrate on the financial crisis because this was a period when insurance against credit 
constraints was most important to firms. Overall, we expect a negative effect of the crisis on the 
outstanding loan amount, which is driven by both credit supply and demand. We saturate this 
by the time fixed effects in the specification (2). If the coefficient of interest turns out to be 
positive, credit unions would have decreased the loan amounts to the same firm at the same 
point in time to a lesser extent than other lenders. This case would lend support to the 
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insurance effect. 
We further investigate the impact of the equity effect, i.e., whether credit unions behave 
differently with respect to their capital ratio than other lenders because they fear that members 
leave during the crisis, by running specification (2) separately for banks with below and above 
median capital ratios (or by triple interaction terms with the equity ratio). In case of an adverse 
equity effect on credit unions, we would expect that the coefficient of interest is larger 
(meaning less negative) in case of credit unions with below median equity ratios. These credit 
unions would not be able to provide as much insurance to their members because they fear 
further members walking away. In the opposite case, credit unions with below median equity 
ratios would even try harder to provide insurance to their members during the crisis. This is also 
plausible because it may reduce the risk that members with outstanding loans have an actual 
incentive to walk away. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this paper, we use a rich dataset from the central bank of Brazil. This dataset contains all the 
information on bank-firm relationships in Brazil. We use all the individual loans data above a 
threshold of Brazilian Real 5,000 (around US-Dollars 2,500) for all the domestic banks active in 
the Brazilian credit market. It permits a very powerful identification within borrowers to 
disentangle between the insurance effect and the equity effect. Specifically, we investigate the 
impact on the extensive margin of the same firm at the same point in time for credit unions 
versus non-credit unions. We obtain the data for an individual bank-firm level relationship from 
the Brazilian credit register. In our analyzes, we use the lending relationships data of 708 credit 
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unions and 126 non-credit unions in Brazil. These credit unions issue loans to 4,249 and there 
are 19,198 firms, which have relation to both credit unions and non-credit unions. In 
In Table 8, we show the number of the banks active in Brazil in the period 2007 to 2010. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
We proceed with quarterly loans from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2011. The data levels 
are triplets on the firm-bank-time level. To control for the firm lending channel, we select only 
agents with relationship to at least two banks. Our identification strategy is to compare the 
behavior of credit unions versus other types of banks borrowing to the same firm at the same 
point of time. We want to investigate these differences in the behavior of banks and credit 
unions during the recent financial crisis. We choose our firms sample in two stages. First, 
following Schnabl (2012), we only include firms that borrow from more than one bank before 
the liquidity shock. Second, following Khwaja and Mian(2008), we exclude firms that 
immediately and entirely stop borrowing from their banks after the shock. We also keep firms 
that had a relationship with domestic banks and foreign banks, but not with credit unions. Table 
9, reports the number summary statistics for the bank control variables over the whole sample. 
[Table 9 here] 
 
In the panel A of Table 10, we report the sample description for credit unions and non-credit 
unions. We show the number of banks for each group, the number of firms with relation to each 
group and the total outstanding amount of loan per each group. In the panel B of this table, we 
report the summary statistics of the lending volume (the dependent variable) and the equity 
ratio for a credit union and non-credit unions. 
[Table 10 here] 
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Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we show the results of our specifications. In the first stage, we examine the 
transmission of liquidity shock to the banks in Brazil. The first hypothesis is whether during the 
crisis credit unions cut their landings less than non-credit unions. This specification poses the 
identification issue of the shock transmission, which affects both lenders and borrowers. In 
order to address this problem, exploiting the detailed nature of our dataset, we control for both 
demand (firm) and supply (bank) fixed effects. The demand or borrower fixed effect lets us 
mitigate the average change in credit demand by firms. The supply fixed effect, on the other 
hand, lets us control for the average variation of banks in Brazil. We use specifications (1) and 
(2) for this stage. 
 
If the coefficient of interest turns out to be positive, credit unions would have decreased the 
loan amounts to the same firm at the same point in time to a lesser extent than other lenders. 
This case would lend support to the insurance effect. 
Table 11 Shows the main results for this first stage. Column (1) shows the results for OLS 
regression (1), without adding any control variable. 
[ Table 11 here] 
 
Column (2) shows the result of regression (2) after adding all the controls with no fixed effects. 
In column (3) we added all the bank controls and firm by time fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) 
contain the results with more than one set of fixed effects. We find that credit unions decreased 
their lending amount to the same firm at the same point in time by 16 % less than non-credit 
unions. The coefficient of Credit Union*Crisis increase to 20 % and remains statistically 
significant in the last column. 
The coefficient for Crisis (although not significant) is negative as we expected. This shows the 
negative impact of the financial crisis on credit driven by both demand and supply. 
For the next stage, we investigate the impact of the equity ratio of the credit unions on their 
lending behavior during the crisis. The result of this stage are shown in Table 12. 
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[ Table 12 here] 
 
The main coefficient of interest is the Credit Union * Equity ratio * Crisis. The sign and the 
significance of this interaction show us whether the credit unions with lower equity ratio during 
crisis tried hard not to compress their lending to their clients. Looking at the coefficient for the 
interaction of credit unions and equity ratio in the fifth row shows that, during the normal 
times, a credit union with higher equity ratio borrow more. However, this changes during the 
crisis. Credit unions with higher equity ratio during distress times, decrease their lending more 
than those with lower equity ratios. This shows that indeed those credit unions with lower 
equity ratios during crisis try hard to provide credit to their members to not suffer from their 
members running away. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we provide empirical evidence that credit unions provide insurance to their 
borrowers during distress times. Using a unique dataset from the Brazilian Central Bank and 
Credit Registry, we could track individual loans from 708 credit unions to 4,249 firms in Brazil. 
Credit unions are special since their borrowers are also their lenders. Thus, we expect them to 
provide more insurance to their borrowers during crisis, compare to other types of banks. Our 
analysis in this paper shows that this is indeed the case. Credit unions decrease their lending 
during financial distress compare to non-credit unions. In addition to that, due to the particular 
member-based governance structure of these institutions, they may face problem of negative 
equity shock since their member may run even during crisis. This problem may add to their 
lending issues. Therefore, as their equity decreases they may cut back their lending more than 
non-credit unions. In this paper, we found that credit unions did not cut back as much on their 
lending during the crisis as their equity was decreasing compared to non-credit unions. This 
implies that these institutions with lower equity ratio try harder to keep their lending from 
falling in order to not lose their members (borrowers). 
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Tables 
 
Table 8: Number of Banks in Brazil by Type of the Institution 
 
The table shows the number of banks that were officially chartered by the Central Bank of Brazil. The data are from the Financial 
Stability Report of the Banco Central do Brazil (2010). Brazilian banks are authorized to operate various types of financial 
activities as "multiple banks," offering commercial banking, investment banking, development banking, mortgage finance, 
leasing, and other financial activities. Multiple banks are usually members of a banking conglomerate that can include 
commercial banks as well as other financial institutions (see Robitaille, 2011). Associations in this table consist of leanings, 
consumer finance companies, saving and loan companies and savings and loan associations, securities brokers, exchange 
brokerage companies and securities dealers. 
 
Type of institution 12/2007 12/2008 12/2009 06/2010 
Multiple banks 135 140 139 139 
Commercial banks 20 18 18 19 
Saving banks 1 1 1 1 
Credit unions 1,465 1,453 1,405 1,388 
Associations 343 369 324 318 
Development agencies 12 12 14 15 
Mortgage companies 6 6 6 6 
Microcredit institutions 52 47 45 45 
Consortium managers 329 317 308 302 
Others 21 21 20 20 
Total 2,437 2,409 2,339 2,315 
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Table 9: Summary Statistics of the Control Variables 
 
This table provides the summary statistics of the bank control variables of the whole sample. Variables are reported in natural 
logarithm. 
 
Variable (in log) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total assets 22.3 2.3 16.56 25.39 
Credit Assets 0.57 0.2 0.17 0.98 
Liquid assets 0.27 0.22 0.001 0.74 
Deposits 0.44 0.2 0.08 0.86 
Return on Average Equity 0.34 0.53 -1.04 2.01 
Bank Capital 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.36 
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Table 10: Bank Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A of this table demonstrates the number of credit unions and other bank types in our dataset. Moreover, it reports the 
number of firms with lending relationship to the banks and the lending volume. Panel B shows the summary statistics of loan 
volume and equity ratio for credit unions and those of non-credit unions. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample description 
 
Group 
 
Number of banks 
 
Number of firms 
Total outstanding loan 
amount (million) 
Credit unions 708 4,249 31,900 
Non-credit unions 126 19,198 1,210,000 
 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of the outstanding loan volume and equity ratio 
Group Mean N Std. dev. Min. Median Max. 
I: Credit unions       
Outstanding loan volume 265,507 120,089 1,810,537 5,000 65,967 191,000,000 
Equity ratio 0.21 12,477 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.40 
II: Non-credit unions       
Outstanding loan volume 2,211,887 547,098 10,900,000 5,000 231,704 961,000,000 
Equity ratio 0.20 2,220 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.40 
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Table 11: Transmission of Liquidity Shock to Brazilian Credit Unions vs. Other Banks in Brazil 
 
This table shows the effect of liquidity shock on bank lending for credit unions. The dependent variables are the natural log of 
the total outstanding amount of loans. We restrict our data to firms with lending relationships to more than one bank before 
the financial crisis. In addition to that, we exclude firms that immediately and entirely stop borrowing from their banks after the 
liquidity shock. Columns (1) shows the results for the OLS regression in the specification (1). Column (2) is the result of OLS 
regression after adding bank specific controls. Columns (3) to (5) report the results of the regression (2) after adding different 
sets of fixed effects. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Crisis -0.0197 -0.0835    
 
Credit union 
(0.0852) 
-1.1002*** 
(0.0995) 
-0.6401* 
 
0.8121*** 
  
 (0.2012) (0.3875) (0.1973)   
Credit union * Crisis 0.0057 0.0685 0.1633** 0.1966** 0.2082*** 
 (0.0865) (0.1069) (0.0750) (0.0768) (0.0749) 
Fixed effects 
Firm-by-time 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
Firm-by-bank No No No Yes Yes 
Bank group-by-time No No No No Yes 
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 667187 667187 667187 667187 667187 
   R-squared  
 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on bank level 
Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2007Q4 to 2009Q4 and zero otherwise (sample period starts in 2006Q1 and ends in 
2011Q4) 
Covariates (bank characteristics): ln(Total assets), Total credit / Total assets, Liquid assets / Total assets, Deposits / Total assets, Equity / Total 
assets (= Equity ratio), ROA (all winsorized on 98%/2% level) 
Including only borrowers with multiple bank relationships at t (at least one of those banks was a credit union) 
Excluding loans below regulatory threshold of 5,000 Real 
Excluding non-performing loans (arrears > 90 days) 
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Table 12: The Effect of Equity Ratio of the Transmission of Liquidity Shock 
 
This table reports the results of the regression (2) for the second hypothesis. The dependent variable is the log of the 
outstanding amount of loans of borrower i from bank b in quarter t. We interact equity ratio with crisis and credit union 
dummy. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient for the Credit Union * Equity ratio * Crisis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Crisis -0.0197 -0.0835       
 (0.0852) (0.0995)       
Credit union -1.1002*** -0.6401* 0.8121***      
 (0.2012) (0.3875) (0.1973)      
Credit union * Crisis 0.0057 0.0685 0.1633** 0.1966** 0.2082*** 0.3892*** 0.5080*** 0.5154*** 
 (0.0865) (0.1069) (0.0750) (0.0768) (0.0749) (0.0888) (0.1451) (0.1327) 
Equity ratio  -0.7498 0.0892 -0.9869** -0.6780* -1.9665*** -1.6540*** -1.3038*** 
 
Credit union * Equity 
 (1.9602) (0.7028) (0.3936) (0.3670) (0.6779) (0.5205) (0.4622) 
ratio      2.5504*** 3.5480*** 3.4610*** 
      (0.4075) (0.8236) (0.8080) 
Equity ratio * Crisis      1.3273*** 1.3690*** 1.2201*** 
 
Credit union * Equity 
     (0.4687) (0.5141) (0.4161) 
ratio * Crisis      -2.2934*** -2.8900*** -2.9272*** 
      (0.4470) (0.7720) (0.7109) 
 
Fixed effects 
        
Firm-by-time No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-by-bank No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank group-by-time No No No No Yes No No Yes 
 
Further covariates 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 667187 667187 667187 667187 667187 667187 667187 667187 
   R-squared  
 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered 
on bank level 
Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2007Q4 to 2009Q4 and zero otherwise (sample period starts in 2006Q1 and ends in 
2011Q4) 
Covariates (bank characteristics): ln(Total assets), Total credit / Total assets, Liquid assets / Total assets, Deposits / Total assets, Equity / Total assets (= 
Equity ratio), ROA (all winsorized on 98%/2% level) 
Including only borrowers with multiple bank relationships at t (at least one of 
those banks was a credit union) 
Excluding loans below regulatory threshold of 5,000 Real 
Excluding non-performing loans (arrears> 90 
days) 
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Chapter 3: Banking Sector Concentration and Lending Risk: Are the Too- 
Big-To-Fails Also the Riskiest? 
 
Leila Aghabarari 
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I. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I investigate the empirical relationship between banking sector 
concentration and banks’ lending risk. Addressing the relation between concen- tration 
and lending risk of banks is important because, a high banking sector con- centration is a 
double-edged sword. It can help financial stability, but, equally, it can trigger fragility. 
Despite the many studies on the relation between bank- ing concentration and financial 
stability, there is no conclusive evidence on this relation. During the recent financial 
crisis, the amount of non-performing loans has increased dramatically increasing the 
fragility of the financial system. Large banks have been suspected of triggering the 
fragility by their delinquency to mon- itor their loans. According to few studies, larger 
banks are often more likely to receive public guarantees or subsidies, which is discussed 
as the ”too big to fail”- doctrine (Mishkin, 1999). As a consequence, the moral hazard 
problem of larger banks’ managers encourages them to take on risky investments under 
a govern- ments’ safety net. The increase in the concentration level of the banking sector 
has been occurring at a rapid pace in many countries around the globe; among the other 
countries Europe has witnessed the fastest consolidation speed after the formation of 
EMU. Consequently, there are a number of pressing questions: Should we slow down 
the concentration? And does the size of new financial in- stitutions cause concerns 
about financial stability? 
In this paper, I show empirical evidence that banking structure matters when an- alyzing 
the impact of size and credit supply on the lending quality of the banks. There is indeed 
a correlation between the level of concentration and the ratio  of non-performing loans. 
However, this higher lending risk is driven by smaller 
banks in the more concentrated banking sector and not, by the large banks or not 
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only because of the increase in credit provision. These findings have several impli- cations, 
particularly for policy makers. This paper supports the ”concentration- fragility” view, 
which implies that higher concentration leads to financial fragility. Therefore, encourages the 
anti-trust and pro-competition policies and regulations. In addition to that the paper unlike 
the previous studies suggests that in order to ensure the stability of the banking system, 
we should focus on supervising small banks more than large banks, as smaller banks can 
amplify the risk of  the banking system. The analysis in this paper complements and 
extends pre- vious  empirical  studies  (Schaeck  and Cˆihak,  2007;  Beck  et  al.,  2006a,b;  
Schaeck et al., 2006; De Nicolo et al., 2004) on this issue. Previous literature such as: Beck  
et  al.,  2006a,b;  Demirgu¨c¸−Kunt  and  Detragiache,  2002  have  studied  the relation between 
banking concentration and episodes of banking crises. Another strand of the literature 
focused on analyzing the effect of banking concentration on  banks’  capital  ratio  as  a  
proxy  for  financial  soundness  (Schaeck  and  Cˆihak, 2007; Schaeck et al.,2006). In this 
study, I estimate the relation between bank- ing sector concentration and the level of non-
performing loans using instruments for the concentration. Nonetheless, I recognize that 
banking concentration may be affected by the level of non-performing loans, this is the 
concern of reverse causality. To precisely identify the role of banking concentration we 
require an exogenous variable that affect the banking concentration and not the level of non- 
performing loans. In particular to control for reverse causality I instrument for banking 
concentration using the political preferences across countries and find that my findings 
are unchanged. 
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II. How can banking sector concentration affect the lending risk of the 
banking industry?– the relation to the literature 
There are several different lessons that may explain the relationship between 
the concentration level of the banking sector and the lending risk of banks. 
First, higher concentration can lead to higher lending risk of the banking indus- 
try via the higher market share of the big banks. 
The market share of large banks following their consolidation may raise the 
moral hazard issue through the unwillingness of governments to allow the large 
banks to fail. Larger banks, who enjoy potentially high public support, may  
take more risk in their lending behavior by decreasing their monitoring actions 
or lending requirements, which can lead to an increase in their number of non- 
performing loans. Regarding the theoretical research on the ”Financial-Fragility” 
view, Mishkin (1999) discusses the moral hazard issue in ”too-big-to-fail” insti- 
tutions that rely on public guarantees more. This public support frees up man- 
agers in large banks to take more risk. This can lead to larger amounts of loan 
defaults and a greater probability of bank failures. Government guarantees to 
support banks may reduce their incentive to priorities (Bagehot, 1873). Gov- 
ernment guarantees regarding future bailouts may induce excessive risk-taking 
by banks (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goodhart and Huang,1999; and Mailath and 
Mester, 1994). Also, the higher risk of larger banks may come from their abuse 
of the monopolistic power in pricing. Boyd and De NicolÂťo (2006) argue that 
monopolistic banks are more likely to charge higher interest rates, which in turn 
encourages borrowers to take more risky actions to compensate for the higher 
loan repayments. 
Second, higher banking sector concentration may lead to higher lending risk of 
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the banking industry via smaller banks. 
Institutions created by consolidation, either through mergers or acquisitions, 
may shift away from providing retail-oriented services for small depositors and 
borrowers because of new opportunities to provide wholesale services for larger 
capital market participants. The larger institutions created by consolidation 
may also choose to provide fewer retail services to small customers because of 
Williamson (1967,1988) type organizational diseconomies. That is, there may 
be scope for inefficiency for one institution to provide services that may require 
the implementation of altogether different policies and procedures. Literature 
has established a link between the size of a banking institution and its lending 
to small businesses, indicating that larger institutions typically devote smaller 
proportions of their assets to small business lending than do smaller banking in- 
stitutions. Berger et al. (1998) find that the effects of consolidation reduce small 
business lending, but are mostly offset by the reactions of other banks. Moreover, 
Peek and Rosengren (1998), based on a small sample of mergers that occurred in 
New England during 1993-1994, find that small business lending falls following 
mergers. The findings of Berger et al. (1998) suggest that small business lending 
increases following small bank mergers but falls following large bank mergers. 
Moreover, several static analyses of Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), Keeton 
(1995), Levonian and Soller (1995), Berger and Udell (1996), Peek and Rosengren 
(1996), Strahan and Weston (1996), and Cole, Goldberg, and White (1997) have 
shown that larger banks devote fewer proportions of their assets to small business 
loans than do small banking organizations. 
Third, higher banking concentration can lead to lower risk via large banks. 
On the contrary, an increase in the assets of large banks can also make more 
  
 
funding and resources available to monitor better their loans or widen the diver- 
sification in their lending portfolio, which therefore decreases the number of loan 
defaults. The ”concentration-stability” view implies that larger banks with higher 
market share and monopoly power in more concentrated systems gain more prof- 
its which, by providing higher capital buffers against liquidity shocks, may lead to 
less fragility in the financial system (Boyd et al., 2004). In any case, a significant 
change in the level of risk of large bank lending can lead to a significant shift in 
the lending risk of the whole banking system. Keeley (1990) shows a correlation 
between higher franchise values of banks and less risky loan approvals from bank 
managers. Park and Peristiani (2007) show that larger franchise values lead to 
higher opportunity costs of bankruptcy. This causes bank managers and share- 
holders to limit the risky actions that could threaten to jeopardize their future 
profits. The higher market power of the banks is linked to higher profits. This 
reduces the incentive for managers and owners alike to assume excessive risk; 
consequently, it lessens the probability of systemic failure (Hellmann et al., 2000; 
Allen and Gale, 2000). Boyd and Prescott (1986) provide evidence that larger 
banks can diversify the risk of their loan portfolio, which is the result of economy 
of scale and scope. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show that larger bank hold-  
ing companies are better diversified compared to their smaller rivals. Financial 
services diversification accredits managers to offer a wider range of services and 
spread the risks of lending across a generous number of asset categories, thereby 
reducing monitoring costs (Diamond, 1984). Meon and Weill (2005) suggest that 
larger banks engage more in cross-border activities, which help them to diversify 
their risks geographically. Moreover, having a limited number of large banks can 
enhance the financial stability by easing the monitoring of the banking system by 
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regulators (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
A. Data 
 
Banking sector concentration and lending risk 
Main variables 
To investigate the relationship between the concentration of the banking sector 
and banks’ lending risk, I use non-performing loans as a proxy of the lending 
risk. The level of non-performing loans shows the quality of loans which can be 
alleviated largely by the appropriate risk management approaches by banks. I 
obtain the data for countries’ non-performing loans from the World Bank Devel- 
opment Indicator (WDI) dataset. The 23 European countries in the sample are: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, 
Finland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Lithua- 
nia, Luxembourg , Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden. Table 
1 reports the level of non-performing loans across all of these countries during the 
years 2004 to 2011. According to this table, non-performing loans more than dou- 
bled in this period, a result perhaps largely owing to the global financial crisis of 
2008-09. Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Portugal are among those countries whose non-performing loans more than 
doubled between 2004 and 2011. Non-performing loans increased dramatically in 
many countries in 2008, when the crisis began. Nevertheless, this increase was 
not dramatic for several countries, including Austria, Germany, Finland, Luxem- 
bourg,  and Sweden.  The next variables I obtained from WDI is the C5 (asset   
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share of the five largest banks in each country) as a measure of banking sector 
concentration, that is the main explanatory variable. There are other proxies for 
concentration, such as HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), C3(asset share of the 
three largest banks) and C4 (asset share of the four largest banks). I use C5 as 
the main measure for concentration in countries, however there are concerns that 
C5 does not use the market shares of all the firms in the industry, and does not 
provide the distribution of firm size. It also does not provide full details about 
the competitiveness of the industry. In order to address this concern, I also check 
for the robustness of my analysis using HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) as an 
indicator for the level of concentration. 
C5 = Σ5 Si Where Si is the share of the assets of bank i relative to the total 
assets of the whole banking system in each country. Table 2 shows the level of 
banking sector concentration (C5) in the 23 countries across years 2004 to 2011. 
In several countries such as Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hun- 
gary, Finland, Lithuania, Netherlands and Sweden the concentration level is high 
and remains high over the period 2004 to 2011. This is not the case for all the 
countries in the sample. 
 
Country level controls 
 
While examining the impact of banking concentration on banks’ non-performing 
loans across different countries, there are regional and macroeconomic factors that 
affect the level of banks’ lending risk. Therefore, I add some country characteris- 
tics from the World Bank dataset to my data list. To capture the business cycle 
effect of each country, I include the growth of GDP in the regression. According 
to Leaven and Majoni (2003), bank investment opportunities may be correlated 
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with business cycles. In times of greater GDP growth, borrowers may have better 
financial abilities to repay their loans. This may improve the lending quality. 
Hence, I expect a negative impact from GDP growth on non-performing loans. 
Legal right is the next country-level variable that I add to capture the status of the 
institutions in these countries. It is the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect the rights of creditors and, thus, facilitate lending. The strength of 
legal rights in countries may improve the flow of liquidity by protecting the rights 
of both lenders and borrowers. On the other hand, since it facilitates lending, it 
can also be positively associated with the level of non-performing loans. I also 
add the regulatory capital to the controls. This is a ratio of total regulatory 
capital to the assets held by deposit takers in the country. The regulatory capital 
is weighted according to the risk of the assets of the institutions. By using this 
indicator, I aim to capture the country level of capital regulation. I expect the 
higher capital regulation to be negatively related to the non-performing loans. I 
add the ratio of foreign banks to total banks, to control for the presence of cross- 
border banking. This can partially offset the limitations of C5 to fully capture 
the effect of multinational banks. 
Role of the banks’ size and support on their lending risk 
Main variables 
In the next set of analyses, I test whether larger banks with higher potential 
support are also those with greater risk level in their lending. To do that, I 
choose the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as the main dependent variable. 
I obtain the annual balance sheet data of all active banks in the corresponding 23 
European countries from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope during the years 2004 to 
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2011. The sample of banks includes commercial banks, saving banks, cooperative 
banks, real estate, and mortgage banks. The geographic coverage of banks and 
the average number of banks per each year in each country is as follows: Austria 
(23), Belgium (21), Bulgaria(7), Czech Republic(3), Germany(335), Denmark 
(31), Estonia (4), Spain (87), Finland (11), France (219), UK (66), Greece (18), 
Croatia (6), Hungary (7), Ireland (13), Italy (265), Lithuania (10), Luxembourg 
(22), Latvia (9), Netherlands (53), Portugal (15), Romania (6), and Sweden (27). 
The number of banks in each country, naturally, changes slightly in some years. 
The analysis focuses on the impact of the size and the potential support of the 
banks on the ratio of banks’ impaired loans. Size is the natural logarithm of the 
banks’ total assets. In addition to the data mentioned earlier, I use Bankscope to 
retrieve Fitch support rating as a measure of the expected support to the banks 
in distress, where a lower value captures greater-than-expected support from a 
higher rates supporter. Thus, these ratings deem the relative strength of both 
the bank and also the potential supporter.  A higher potential support may  be  
a banks’ incentive to take higher risk. I use this rating to capture the possible 
higher risk-taking by highly supported banks. Table 3 provides the definitions for 
Fitch support ratings which classify each bank with either a high or low possibility 
of being bailed out in the future. Using this rating and the size of the bank, I can 
recognize the effect of the size and support on the lending risk of the banks. I use 
the ratio of 1/Fitch support rating to be the index for support. Incorporating the 
reverse ratio of Fitch makes the interpretation simpler. 
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Bank level controls 
In this regression, I need to control for bank specific characteristics that also 
affect banks’ lending. I choose Tier1, which is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets for determining the capital adequacy of the banks. 
I expect banks with the higher Tier1 ratio to operate with less risk. Thus, the 
effect from Tier 1 on the impaired loans should be negative. To explore the impact 
on liquidity risk, I follow Bonfim and Kim (2014) and include the ratio of liquid 
assets to deposits and short-term borrowings as a measure of maturity mismatch. 
Liquid assets are trading assets and loans and advances with a maturity of less 
than three months. I expect a negative impact of liquidity ratio on banksâĂŹ 
lending risk. The next bank-specific factor that I add as a control variable  is  
the leverage, which is the ratio of total assets to equity. A relatively high ratio 
(indicating lots of assets and tiny equity) may indicate the bank has taken on 
substantial debt merely to remain in business, but a high asset/equity ratio can 
also mean the return on borrowed capital exceeds the cost of that capital. At 
some higher levels, however, the ratio can reach unsustainable levels. A highly 
leveraged bank may be known as a risky bank. Therefore, I expect the leverage 
to be positively related to the lending risk of the bank. I also include bank 
income and profitability to controls. Both of these characteristics can include 
both positive and negative risk-taking by banks. In general, there is a long-term 
positive effect of risk on return, but the large ratio of non-performing loans may 
be the effect of some particular losses at any point in time. Also, the impact of 
income and profitability of banks on their lending risk might be affected by the 
type of activity at the bank. Since greater lending may imply a deterioration in 
the quality of loans, I add the total lending (growth of gross loans) to the list 
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of bank control variables. I expect a positive effect from the level of lending on 
impaired loans. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis and results 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper consists of two parts. The first part in- 
vestigates whether and how the banking sector concentration affects the lending 
risk of banks. I regress the ratio of non-performing loans of banking sector on the 
concentration level, employing different methodologies. However, using macroe- 
conomic data, we cannot recognize which are the banks that drive the results of 
this part, nor assess the potentially heterogeneous effects of banks’ characteris- 
tics. Therefore, in the second part using bank level data I examine the impact of 
the banks’ size and their potential public support on the individual banks’ ratio 
of non-performing loans. 
 
Impact of banking sector concentration on non-performing loans 
 
Here I present empirical evidence on the role of banking concentration on non- 
performing loans. I analyze this with the regression of the non-performing loans 
on the level of banking sector concentration and adding all the controls. 
(NPL) jt= α + β1  BSCjt−1  +ΣκjXjt−1  + φj+ τt+ sjt 
 
Where (NPL) jt is the level of non-performing loans of country j at time t. 
BSCjt is the level of banking sector concentration in country j at time t-1. β1 
which is the main coefficient of interest is that of banking sector concentration. 
Xjt−1  is  the  vector  of  control  time  varying  variables:  GDP  growth;  legal  right; 
regulatory capital and foreign banks.  φj is the country fixed effect, which captures 
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all unobserved country characteristics which are almost unchanged over time. τt 
represents the time dummies. Standard errors are clustered in country level. The 
choice of using fixed effect instead of random effect is done by Hausman test, 
which suggest the better fit of fixed effect. 
Table 6 reports the results of the analysis of the impact of banking concen- 
tration on the non-performing loans. According to this table, banking industry 
concentration enters our regression, significantly positive. Columns (1) and (2) 
show the results of the OLS regressions, where the coefficient of concentration 
is positive, and it increases in the second column after adding country controls. 
Columns (3) to (4) show the results for e fixed-effects (within) regression esti- 
mator, after adding the country and time dummies. These results also show a 
positive and significant link between banking sector concentration and the level 
of non-performing loans. 
 
 
Instrumental Variable 
 
The reverse causality and endogeneity in the analysis of the effect of bank- 
ing concentration and non-performing loans are matters of concern. The level 
of concentration in the banking industry may be affected by the scale of non- 
performing loans. Moreover there may be unobserved variables which affect both 
banking concentration and lending risk. To precisely identify the role of bank- 
ing sector on banks’ lending risk we need an exogenous variable which affects 
the level of concentration independent of the level of lending risk. I address the 
issue of reverse causality by analyzing the impact of banking concentration on 
lending risk using the weighted index of political preferences as the instrumental 
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variable. Market-regulation is the specific political preference which I use as the 
instrument for banking concentration. This is the Support for policies designed 
to create a fair and open economic market, which may include: calls for increased 
consumer protection; increasing economic competition by preventing monopolies 
and other actions disrupting the functioning of the market; defense of small busi- 
nesses against disruptive powers of big businesses; social market economy. More 
details on the market-regulation variable is presented in the appendix. I obtain 
the data for the political parties manifestos from Manifesto Project dataset1. How 
can the index of market-regulation affect the level of banking concentration? In- 
directly, larger banks are known to offer loans with higher interest rates. Studies 
such as Berger and Hannan (1989, 1997) and Hennan (1991) found that banks in 
more concentrated markets charge higher rates on small business loans and pay 
lower rates on retail deposits. The pro âĂĲâĂİmarket- regulationâĂİ preferences 
affect the concentration negatively to protect costumers from high interest rates. 
In addition, the attempt to increase competition by preventing monopolies can 
directly lead to the drafting of anti-concentration laws. 
(BSC) jt= α + β1  (Market-regulation)jt +ΣκjXjt−1  + φj+ τt+ sjt 
Where (BSC) jt is the level of banking sector concentration in country j at time t. 
and (Market-regulation)jt is the market-regulation index I use from the manifesto 
dataset.  Xjt−1  is  the  set  of  country  control  variables;  GDP  growth,  legal  right, 
regulatory  capital  and  the  ratio  of  foreign  banks.  φj  is  the  country  fixed  effect. 
τt shows time dummies.  Finally, sjt is the error term. 
and the second stage: 
(NPL) jt= α + β1  BSCjt +ΣκjXjt−1  + φj+ τt+ sjt 
1Please consult: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/documents/information for more in- 
formation 
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Where (NPL) jt is the level of non-performing loans of country j at time t. BSCjt 
is the estimated banking sector concentration from the first stage regression in 
country j at time t. β1 which is the main coefficient of interest is that of banking 
sector concentration. 
 
 
 
 
In Table 6 columns (5) and (6) report the results for the instrumental variables 
method. The coefficient of concentration in columns (3) and (6) are between 0.14 
to 0.39, with the significance level of one percent. Thus also using the instrumental 
variables approach, I see a positive impact from banking concentration on non- 
performing loans. Banking sector concentration coefficients in this table imply 
that an increase in banking market concentration has a positive impact on the 
ratio of non-performing loans. The results from the two last columns confirm 
the positive effect of banking concentration on non-performing loans. This is  
in line with the ”concentration-fragility” view in the literature. Thus, the more 
concentrated the banking industry, the higher is the lending risk of banks. Among 
the control variables GDP growth has a negative sign in all the regressions. This 
is in line with our expectation, which shows that the ratio of non-performing 
loans decreases when the growth is higher, and the country experiences an output 
growth. Legal right has a positive impact on lending risk, this may be due to  
the fact that this variables show the ease of lending. Higher level of capital 
regulatory leads to lower level of non-performing loans, which is also in line with 
our expectations. A higher ratio of foreign banks in the country increases the 
level of non-performing loans. 
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Impact of the size and the support on banks’ lending risk 
 
In the previous section, the analysis shows that there is a positive and signifi- 
cant effect of banking concentration on the aggregate lending risk of the banks. 
One might suspect that this result is driven by the larger and potentially more 
supported banks. In the second set of analysis I investigate the effect of size on 
the lending risk. I use the following fixed effect approach in this part: 
(IL)ijt=α + β1 (size)ijt−1 + λ1 (support)ijt−1 + γ1 sizeijt−1*supportijt−1+ ΣκiXijt−1 
+ φj  + ηi + τt+ sit 
 
Where (IL)ijt is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans of bank i at time 
t; (size)ijt is the natural log of the total assets of bank i in country j at time t; 
(support)ijt is the potential support of bank i in country j at time t; Xijt−1 is the 
vector of bank controls; φj  is the country fixed effect; ηi is the bank fixed effects 
and τt are the time dummies. 
7 reports the results of the regressions of banks’ impaired loans on their size 
and support. The main dependent variables is the ratio of impaired loans on 
gross loans on the bank level. The first four columns are the results of the OLS 
regressions without the fixed effects. Columns (5) to (8) of this table include the 
country fixed effects, bank fixed effects and the time dummies. Note that the 
number of observations change once I incorporate the support in the equations. 
This is because the data for the Fitch support rating is not reported for all the 
banks in the Bankscope dataset. We are interested in the effect of size on the 
ratio of impaired loans: ∂ ILijt/ ∂size ijt = β1 + γ1support ijt 
which for the last column of the table is: 
∂ ILijt/  ∂size  ijt =  −2.1 − 0.19supportijt Which  is  always  negative  regardless 
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of the value of support (Note that support take a value between 0.5 and 1). The 
results are the same if we take replace the coefficients of any other column. This 
implies that size has always a negative impact on the ratio of impaired loans. 
The effect of support on the lending risk is may be more important for the 
policy makers. 
∂ ILijt / ∂supportijt = λ1 + γ1sizeijt 
Which is: 
∂ ILijt/ ∂support ijt = 1.03 -0.22 sizeijt. This ratio is negative for size larger 
than 4.68 in this case. This condition changes depending on the method. However, 
one general result is that, for larger banks if the support is higher, the level of 
impaired loans decreases. Since this result may be driven by reverse causality 
between the impaired loans and the support, I check the robustness by using 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimator. The signs of the coefficients 
still hold after robustness checks. I report the tables and the models of the 
robustness checks in the next section. 
Among the control variables, income has an adverse impact on banks’ lending 
risk, which indicates that banks with higher income to equity ratio have less non- 
performing loans in their balance sheet. These banks with higher income may 
be able to invest more in monitoring and negotiating their lending conditions. 
Liquidity enters the regressions most of the time negative. Coefficient of liquidity 
is significant only in the last two columns of the table. This result implies that 
more liquid banks are less risky in their lending; this is in line with our primary 
expectations. Leverage has a positive and always significant effect on the lending 
risk. Finally, more lending leads to a higher level of impaired loans, this is shown 
by the coefficients of Lending. 
  
 
Table 8 reports the results of the analysis on the size and the concentration. 
We are interested in the effect of size on the lending risk: 
∂ ILijt / ∂sizeijt = β1 + β2BSCijt 
For the second column it is: ∂ ILijt / ∂sizeijt = -3.53 + 4.02 *BSCijt Which  is 
negative for BSC larger than 0.87. This implies that, in highly concentrated 
banking sector (higher than 0.87), the smaller banks have larger ratio of impaired 
loans, compared to other banks. 
 
Robustness checks 
 
As following: 
Generalized method of moments 
In addition to the reverse causality issues which I addressed above, there is the 
concern of endogeneity and the fact that in a dynamic context in a dynamic con- 
text the lagged dependent variable may depend on the panel-level effects and lead 
to an inconsistent estimator when the time dimension is limited (Nickell, 1981). 
To get around this potential inconsistency problem I also report the GMM esti- 
mators which have as additional advantages that they require no distributional 
assumptions and allow for heteroscedasticity of unknown form which was devel- 
oped for dynamic panel models. Using this approach I combine the lagged levels 
of non-performing loans and BSC with first differences of the instrument to es- 
timate the coefficient of BSC. In addition to that I test also the impact of HHI 
instead of BSC. 8. The first two columns report the results of the GMM estima- 
tion. The coefficient of concentration (C5) is positive between 0.41 to 0.44 and 
significant at one percent level. This coefficient is positive and significant also 
for HHI. This table confirms that the result of the paper about the impact of   
18 
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concentration on non-performing loans holds also after sensitivity checks. shows 
the result of robustness checks. I am aware that the GMM estimator is the best 
for the large sample size, and in this case my sample size is too small. However 
as a robustness check we can trust the results. This is the dynamic version of the 
regression:  (NPL) jt= α + α1  (NPL)jt−1+ Σβn (BSC)jt−c +ΣκjXjt−1  + φj+ 
τt+ sjt 
Where, (NPL)jt is the ratio of non-performing loans in country j at time t. 
(BSC)jt−1 is the level of concentration of the banking industry in country j.  The 
explanatory variable enters the regression with one time lag.  Xjt−1  is the vector 
of  country  controls.   φj  is  the  country  fixed  effect  and  τt  is  the  symbol  for  the 
time dummies. The main coefficient of interest is the β1. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper estimates the impact of banking sector concentration on the lending 
risk of banks in 23 European countries during the years 2004 to 2011. The outcome 
of this paper provides empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship 
between banking sector concentration and banks’ lending risk. To address the 
concern about the moral hazard of large banks in the highly-concentrated banking 
industry, I estimate the impact of the size and potential public support of the 
banks. I show that larger banks, independent of the level of their support, have a 
smaller ratio of impaired loans. The effect of potential support on lending depends 
on the size of the banks. Higher support leads to fewer problematic loans if the 
bank is large enough. This result rolls out the moral hazard of ”too-big-to-fails” 
which comes from the public support of very large banks. The higher lending risk 
within a more highly concentrated banking sector is therefore not because of the 
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higher risk of larger banks, but, instead, is driven by medium and smaller banks. 
This paper shows empirical evidence that small banks in the highly concentrated 
banking sector have more impaired loans than either large banks or small banks 
in the lower concentrated banking industry. One explanation may be the idea 
that larger banks provide loans and services to larger and less risky borrowers, 
while smaller banks pick up smaller and, possibly more risky, borrowers, leading 
to higher numbers of bad loans. This can be especially problematic during times 
of economic distress. Another possibility to explain this result is that larger 
banks are more efficient and enjoy better risk management than their smaller 
counterparts. 
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VI. Tables 
 
Table 1— Non-Performing Loans Across Countries and Years 
This table shows the non performing laans across 23 European countries and during years 
2004 to 2011. The level of non-perfomring laons is the depnedent variable in the main ana- 
lyisis. It is the ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and principal past due by 90 
days or more) to total gross loans (total value of loan portfolio) 
Belgium 2.3 2 1.7 1.4 1.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 
Bulgaria 2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 6.4 11.0 14.9 
Czech Republic 4 3.9 3.6 2.7 2.8 4.6 5.4 5.5 
Germany 4.9 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.3 
Denmark 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.2 3.3 4.1 3.5 
Estonia 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.9 5.2 5.4 4 
Spain 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.7 5.3 
Finland 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
France 4.2 3.5 3 2.7 2.8 4 3.8 3.7 
United Kingdom 1.9 1 0.9 0.9 1.6 3.5 4 3.9 
Greece 7 6.3 5.4 4.5 5 7.7 10.4 14.7 
Hungary 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.3 3 6.7 9.8 13.3 
Croatia 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.8 4.9 7.7 11.1 12.3 
Ireland 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 2.6 9 8.6 14.7 
Italy 6.6 5.3 6.6 5.8 6.3 9.4 10 11 
Lithuania 2.2 0.6 1 1 4.6 19.3 19.7 16.4 
Luxembourg 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 
Latvia 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.8 3.6 16.4 19 17.5 
Netherlands 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.7 3.2 2.8 2.7 
Portugal 2 1.5 2 2.8 3.6 4.8 5.2 6.9 
Romania 8.1 1.4 1.8 2.6 2.8 7.9 11.9 14.1 
Sweden 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.6 1 2 1.5 1.8 
Source: World Development Indicator, World Bank 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.8 2.7 
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Table 2— Banking Sector Concentration Across Countries and Years. 
This table reports the variation of the banking sector concentration for the countries 
during years 2004 through 2011 in the sample. The banking sector concentration is the main 
explanatory variable in the analysis of this paper. The data for the banking concentration is 
from the World Development Indicator (WDI) dataset from the World Bank. This variable 
is the asset share of the five largest banks in the each country. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 74.1 76.3 72.4 68.5 73.9 65 71.2 73.2 
Belgium 95.3 95.7 95.9 96.4 96.1 93.6 91.8 93.2 
Bulgaria 74.7 68.4 66.5 78.5 74.3 78 71.7 69.5 
Czech Republic 75.4 80.2 78.3 79.9 81.9 76.6 77.5 78.9 
Germany 85.7 85.5 83.8 84.3 84.8 84.7 85.8 85.6 
Denmark 90.4 88.7 87.3 87.7 89 88.6 90 91.1 
Estonia 100 100 100 98.8 100 100 100 98 
Spain 96.3 82.2 81.1 83.9 85.3 83.2 83.4 77 
Finland 100 100 100 100 98.1 97.6 98 98.5 
France 71.6 73.9 74.8 76.3 74 78.7 79.9 76.2 
United Kingdom 78.4 65.3 66.8 73.9 78 75.2 75.5 76.6 
Greece 94.0 89.7 81.1 85.5 85 83.6 83.7 94.4 
Croatia 78.4 77.8 77 72.5 77 75.8 75.6 76.2 
Hungary 83.4 84.9 85.6 90.4 89.2 93.4 92.9 93.6 
Ireland 100 82.7 82.3 84.3 90.2 90.7 88.6 87.6 
Italy 94 47.8 49.6 56.8 63.1 65.1 68.7 71.2 
Lithuania 89 91.9 88.2 87.6 87.4 86.8 85.5 91.51 
Luxembourg 44.5 46.4 46.4 37.5 39 41.3 46.1 45.5 
Latvia 66.3 72.4 75 70.8 72.7 70.2 63.5 65.6 
Netherlands 91.3 94 93.7 95.1 94.5 94.4 92.5 93 
Portugal 100 96.7 93.4 91.3 90.8 92.2 92.6 96 
Romania 80.2 80.9 87.1 85.5 84 84 76.7 73.4 
Sweden 98.1 98.2 97.6 97.6 97.6 96.4 96.2 96.6 
Source: World Development Indicator, World Bank 
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Table 3— Fitch Support Rating 
This table shows the definition of different Fitch support ratings. 
  Fitch support rating Definitions  
1 A bank for which there is an extremely high probability 
of external support. The potential provider of support 
is very highly rated in its own right and has a very 
high propensity to support the bank in question. This 
probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term 
Rating floor of ’A-’. 
2 A bank for which there is a high probability of exter- 
nal support. The potential provider of support is highly 
rated in its own right and has a high propensity to pro- 
vide support to the bank in question. This probability 
of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating floor 
of ’BBB-’. 
3 A bank for which there is a moderate probability of 
support because of uncertainties about the ability or 
propensity of the potential provider of support to do 
so. This probability of support indicates a minimum 
Long-Term Rating floor of ’BB-’. 
4 A bank for which there is a limited probability of sup- 
port because of significant uncertainties about the abil- 
ity or propensity of any possible provider of support to 
do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum 
Long-Term Rating floor of ’B’. 
5 A bank for which there is a possibility of external sup- 
port, but it cannot be relied upon. This may be due to 
a lack of propensity to provide support or to very weak 
financial ability to do so. This probability of support 
indicates a Long-Term Rating floor no higher than ’B-’ 
  and in many cases, no floor at all  
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Table 4— Descriptions of the variables and their sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Country level variables 
Non-performing loan (NPL)s Ratio  of  defaulting   loans  (Payment   of  interest  and World Bank 
principal past due 90 days or more) 
Banking sector Ratio of a  country’s total World Bank 
concentration (BSC) banking system’s assets held by 5 largest banks of 
each country assets held by 5 largest banks of each 
country 
GDP growth Growth of GDP World Bank 
Legal rights Degree of which collateral and bankruptcy laws pro- 
tect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus fa- 
cilitate lending 
Regulatory capital The capital adequacy of deposit takers. It is a ratio 
of total regulatory capital to its assets held, weighted 
according to risk of those assets. 
Foreign bank to total banks Percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to 
the number of the total banks in an Economy.  A  
foreign bank is a bank where 50 percent or more of     
its shares are owned by foreigners. 
Market regulation Support for policies designed to create a fair and open 
economic market. May include: Calls for increased 
consumer protection; Increasing economic competi- 
tion by preventing monopolies and other actions dis- 
rupting the functioning of the market; Defence of  
small businesses against disruptive powers of big busi- 
nesses; Social market economy. 
World Bank 
World Bank 
World Bank 
Bank level variables 
Impaired loans Impaired loans to gross loans Bankscope 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index Bankscope 
Support 1/(Fitch support rating) Bankscope 
Profitability Return on average equity Bankscope 
Lending log(Gross Loans) Bankscope 
Size Log of total assets BankScope 
Leverage 1/equity ratio BankScope 
Liquidity Ratio of liquid assets to total deposits and borrowings BankScope 
Income Net Income to Equity BankScope 
Tier 1 Tier 1 ratio BankScope 
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Table  5— Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Sd N 
NPL 3.619 2.157 184 
BSC 83.625 5.446 184 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index 0.12 .08 184 
GDP growth 1.29 2.63 184 
Legal rights 7.2 1.06 184 
Regulatory capital 10.33 5.38 184 
Ratio of Foreign banks 42.09 30.6 184 
Market regulation 6.55 3.07 184 
Market regulation*relative seats 92.42 37.62 184 
All the banks Impaired loans 4.97 4.86 6600 
Profitability 4.37 5.54 6600 
Lending 20.37 1.96 6600 
Size 20.94 1.95 6600 
Leverage 0.18 2.58 6600 
Liquidity 16.76 11.18 6600 
Income 3.80 13.11 6600 
Tier 1 12.12 4.03 6600 
Banks with available data for FSR Impaired loans 5.72 7.13 3608 
Support 0.69 0.319 3608 
Profitability 1.81 4.07 3608 
Lending 24.09 1.95 3608 
Size 22.67 1.88 3608 
Leverage 0.46 5.23 3608 
Liquidity 21.48 16.38 3608 
Income 2.65 20.13 3608 
Tier 1 12.17 23.94 3608 
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Table 6— Impact of banking sector concentration on banks’ non-performing loans. The 
dependent variables is the level of non-performing loans. The first column is the OLS re- 
gression of NPL on concentration Columns () and () show the result for the following fixed 
effect  model.  (NPL)jt=α+  β1 (BSC)jt−1 +  Σκj Xjt−1 +  φj  +  τt  +sjt 
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS OLS FE FE IV IV 
BSC 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
GDP growth -0.19∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Legal right 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.17) 
Regulatory capital -0.10∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Ratio of foreign banks 1.03∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 
(0.54) (0.53) (0.02) 
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184 
R2 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.27 
F-statistics of first stage 13.75 16.98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 7— The impact of size and support on the banks’ lending risk 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) IL 
 IL  IL  IL  IL  IL  IL  IL 
Size -0.08∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -1.36∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗ -2.07∗∗∗ -2.10∗∗∗ (0.03) 
 (0.10)  (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.43)  (0.58)  (0.58) 
Support 0.39∗∗      0.22     1.03∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗ -1.15 -1.16 
(0.2 ) (0.26) (0.33) (0.22) (1.24) (1.40) 
Income -0.04∗∗∗  -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗  -0.02∗∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Liquidity -0.03∗∗  -0.03∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗   -0.05∗∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Profitability -0.02∗∗∗  -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗   -0.01∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tier 1 -0.06       -0.04 -0.10∗∗∗   -0.10∗∗ 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Leverage 0.66∗∗∗  0.62∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗  0.22∗∗∗ 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Lending 1.48∗∗∗   1.63∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗    0.92∗∗∗ 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) 
Size*Support -0.22∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 
(0.05) (0.06) 
Country Fixed Effect       No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes               
Bank Fixed Effect No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8865         3608         3608         3608         8865         3608         3608    3608 
R2 0.00 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.46 0.46 0.48 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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Table 8— The impact of banks’ size and concentration on the lending risk 
The corresponding regression is:  (IL) ijt= α + β1 Sizeijt−1 + β2 Size*BSCijt−1 + ΣκiXit−1 + φj + 
τt     sjt 
where (concentration)jt−c can be either BSC and HHI in country j at time t. 
(1) (2) (3) 
  OLS FE IV  
Size  -1.6∗∗ -3.02∗∗∗ -3.53∗∗∗ 
(0.53)  (0.36)  (0.9) 
BSC*Size 1.95∗∗∗ 3.5 ∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Income 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗ 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Liquidity 0.03∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
Profitability -0.18∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗  -0.05 
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.05) 
Tier 1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.34∗ 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.18) 
Leverage 0.54∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (0.26) 
Lending 1.17∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 
  (0.49) (0.23) (0.99)  
Bank fixed effect No Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects       No Yes Yes 
Time dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 8865 8865 8865 
R2 0.33 0.52 
  F-test 24.32  
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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Table 9— The impact of concentration on non-performing loans (GMM style regressions) 
corresponding regression is:  (NPL) jt= α + α1 (NPL)jt−1+ Σβn (concentration)jt−c +Σκj Xjt−1 + 
φj + τt+ sjt 
  where (concentration)jt−c can be either BSC and HHI in country j at time t.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GMM GMM GMM GMM  
NPL(lagged) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08) 
BSC 0.41∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 
(0.01)  (0.16) 
HHI 3.23∗∗∗ 6.50∗∗∗ 
(0.3) (0.2) 
GDP growth -4.36∗∗∗ -7.7∗∗∗ 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Legal right 1.00∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 
(0.11) (0.2) 
Regulatory capital -0.36∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ 
0.02  (0.04) 
Ratio of foreign banks 0.93∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 
(0.48) (0.06) 
Observations 106 97 106 97 
P value of Sargan 0.25 0.31 0.23 0.29 
P  value of AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
P  value of AR(2) 0. 00 0.102 0.19 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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Table 10— The impact of banks’ size and support on the ratio of impaired loans (GMM  
style) 
(1) (2) 
  GMM GMM  
IL (lagged) 0.72∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 
(0.04)  (0.06) 
Size -1.62 -3.07∗∗ 
(1.13) (1.39) 
Fitch Support Rating -0.41 -1.01 
(1.04) (1.10) 
size*support -0.24∗∗ -0.14 
(0.12) (0.15) 
Income -0.01 
(0.01) 
Liquidity -0.23∗∗∗ 
(0.04) 
Profitability -0.01 
(0.01) 
Tier 1 0.22∗∗∗ 
(0.09) 
leverage -0.60∗∗∗ 
(0.21) 
Lending 0.70 
  (2.79)  
Observations 1953 1813 
P value of Sargan 0.39 0.48 
P  value of AR(1) 0.00 0.00 
  P  value of AR(2) 0.06 0.04  
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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VII. Appendix 
 
Instrumental variables 
 
The numbers in the dataset for variables constitute the relative share of state- 
ments for each category to all statements in the manifesto. Number ”0.35” means 
that 0.35 percent of the manifesto were devoted to that category.  Since this is  
a relative share, the scale can run between zero (no statement at all) and 100 
(the whole manifesto is about this category). As the first step to identify the 
instruments, I obtain the data for most relevant economic approaches from the 
Manifesto dataset for the 23 countries in the sample for all the years between 
2003 to 2011. The reason this data goes further back to 2003 is that I expect 
any impact from the politics on concentration to be with time lags. The primary 
variables are all those which fit the general economic statements that can affect 
the financial and economic decisions in the countries. There are more than 15 
variables in the Manifesto project dataset that show relevant economic concepts. 
To see the relative share of the preferences of the indicator of the variable in  
the manifesto, I multiply the corresponding number of the preference by the per- 
centage of seats (The ratio of the absolute number of the seats of each party to 
the total seat numbers of the parliament in specific years). The numbers in the 
dataset are limited to the times of local elections. For the years when there is no 
election, I assume that the preferences and the relative seat numbers remain the 
same as the last previous elections’ date. 
M anif estozjt = ζzjt ∗ seatszjt  M 
Manif estojt = µ(M anif estozjt) 
Where ζzjt is the relative share of the statements about a preference of choice in 
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the manifesto of party Z in country j at time t. µ is the mean of the interaction of 
the preferences and the seat numbers of each party, in each country for each exist- 
ing year. Thus, M anif estojt is the index of the political preferences in countries 
over years weighted by their decision power (seat numbers)). After analyzing 
the impact of different political preferences on the banking concentration, I find 
Manifestojt to be negatively related to concentration more than other 
statements, with no evidence for its impact on non-performing loans. The 
manifesto project defines the Market regulation as the support for poli- cies 
designed to create a fair and open economic market, which may include: (i) 
calls for increased consumer protection; (ii) increasing economic competition by 
preventing monopolies and other actions disrupting the functioning of the market; 
(iii) defense of small businesses against the disruptive powers of big businesses; 
and (iv) the social market economy. 
In order to be an appropriate instrument, the Manifestojt should not directly 
affect non-performing loans. I show the correlation matrix between the 
instrument, concentration and level of non-performing loans in the table below. 
According to this matrix: there is a high correlation between the instruments 
BSC NPL Market regulation 
  
BSC 1.00 
NPL 0.12 ∗∗∗ 1.00 
Market regulation -0.47∗∗∗ 0.04 1.00 
 
 
 
and the concentration. The correlation between non-performing loans and the 
instruments, meanwhile, is not significant. 
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